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Title Insurance: Recovery for Emotional Distress
for Wrongful Failure to Defend
One of the benefits1 title insurance policies are designed to
provide is a powerful, tenacious defender when a potential adverse claimant challenges the validity of the insured's title.2 However, because the title insurance company often has little to lose
1. The title insurance industry has received much criticism in recent years. The basic
problem seems to be that few benefits are received for the price paid for title insurance.
Johnstone, Title Insurance, 66 YALEL.J. 492, 494-95 (1957); Quiner, Title Insurance and
INS.L. ANN.711 (1973); Roberts, Title Insurance:
the Title Insurance Industry, 22 DRAKE
State Regulation and the Public Perspective, 39 IND.L.J. 1, 5 (1963). Attempted attacks
on or reforms of the title insurance industry have focused on three general areas. First,
attempts have been made to increase legislative control of the industry at the state and
national level. Mortgage Settlement Costs: Hearings on S. 2775 Before the Subcomm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). A recent article on title
insurance summarizes the state of legislation in this area as follows:
The environment in which title insurance operates seems very conducive to
profit. State regulation seems to be lacking. Strict regulation systems do not
appear to be prevalent, and in general, regulation is not as effective as with
property and casualty insurance. Moreover, title insurance companies are operated predominately in oligopolies.
Quiner, supra a t 727. The legislative approach to solving the problems of title insurance
seems to have lost momentum in recent years.
Second, in the absence of legislative action, opponents of the title insurance industry
have turned to the courts in an effort to regulate the industry under the federal antitrust
acts. The thrust of their argument has been that the title insurance industry is monopolistic and devoid of any meaningful price competition and should, therefore, be broken up
and regulated by the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975);Schwartz v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp.
Pa. 1974); Commander Leasing Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 477 F.2d 77
302 (E.D.
(10th Cir. 1973). These cases held, however, that title insurance is "insurance," as the
word is used in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. $8 1011-1015 (1970), and qualifies
for the insurance exemption from federal antitrust laws. Because of this interpretation by
the courts, this approach has not been successful. See Note, The Applicability of AntiL.REV.810 (1973).
trust Laws to the Insurance Industry, 22 DRAKE
A third approach relies upon general insurance law concepts and asks the courts to
broadly interpret the duties owed by title insurers to their clients. Examples of this
approach include the courts' willingness to find a "duty to search" from the surrounding
circumstances, which allows a recovery in tort notwithstanding the contract provisions.
For an excellent summary of this topic, see Comment, Title Insurance: The Duty to
Search, 71 YALEL.J. 1161 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Search].
2. Title insurance has been criticized as being a marginal investment for a homeowner. Roberts, supra note 1, a t 5; Johnstone, supra note 1, a t 494. Commentators generally'agree, however, that "[olne advantage that title insurance provides over other forms
of title protection is that the title insurer agrees to defend a t its expense all litigation
against the insured based upon a title defect covered in the policy." Johnstone, supra note
1, a t 499-500. Roberts, supra note 1, a t 4, states: "Most significant, perhaps, is the fact
that the company undertakes to defend the title as insured: in effect, if nothing else, the
vendee has retained a powerful champion against the day a potential adverse claimant
appears."
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by refusing to defend when policy coverage is in doubt, the insured may find himself without a defender.3 The insurer's refusal
to defend may result in inconvenience, lost business opportunities, and mental distress to the insured-none of which can be
recovered using traditional remedies.' In the recent California
case of Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance C O . ,however,
~
the jury awarded damages of $200,000 for emotional distress
caused by the title insurer's wrongful failure to defend.R This
comment will briefly review traditional remedies for wrongful
failure to defend under title insurance policy terms and discuss
recent developments that may provide remedies that encourage
title insurers to defend.

A. The Duty to Defend
Title insurance policies generally contain a clause that obligates the company to defend the insured to the extent the dispute involves an aIleged defect covered by the policy.' General
insurance law looks to the face of the complaint to determine
whether the injuries are within the terms of the policy coverage?
Under this rule, if the formal claim against the insured alleges
facts within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is obligated to
3. If a title insurer refuses to defend, forcing the insured to defend his title, and the
court finds no policy coverage, then the title insurer incurs no liability. If, however, the
court determines that the title policy covered the defect, then the company is liable for
costs and losses incurred by the insured in defending the action. Further, the insurer is
bound by the material findings of fact in the suit against the insured and is liable for
judgments or reasonable settlements that result. The insured may, however, have to bring
a second action against the insurer to enforce the holding of the first action. See Curtis,
Title Assurance in Sales of California Residential Realty: A Critique of Title Insurance
and Title Covenants with Suggested Reforms, 7 PAC.L.J. 1, 15-16 (1976); 9 J. APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE
LAWPRACTICE§ 5216 (1943). If there is any question of policy coverage, the
insurer often comes out ahead by refusing to defend. If it is determined that there was no
coverage, the insurer has saved the costs of defense; if it is determined that the policy did
cover the title defect, the insurer often incurs no greater cost than if he had defended.
4. See text accompanying notes 22-28 infra.
5. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1975).
6. Id. a t 925, 122 Cal. Rptr. a t 476.
OF MODERN
REALPROPERTY
LAW1011, 1020 (1974); 9 J.
7. E. RAEIIN,FUNDAMENTALS
APPLEMAN,
supra note 3, 4 5216.
8. 7A J. APPLEMAN,
supra note 3, 5 4683; R. KEETON,INSURANCE
LAW§ 7.6(a) (1971);
Comment, The Insurer's Duty to Defend Under a Liability Insurance Policy, 114 U. PA.
L. REV. 734, 734-35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Defend]; Note, The Insurer's
Duty to Defend Made Absolute: Gray v. Zurich, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1328 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Duty to Defend Made Absolute]. Of course, the insurer has the
supra note
burden of proof in cases where the pleadings are ambiguous. 7A J. APPLEMAN,
3, § 4683, a t 440.
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defend, regardless of the true nature of the facts.gConversely, the
insurer is under no obligation to defend if the allegations do not
fit within the policy coverage, regardless of the actual details?
This rule is criticized a s being inadequate under today's
relaxed pleading requirements, which are designed only to put
the opposing party on notice-the complaint often will not precisely reflect the opposing party's claim or predict the basis of any
relief." For example, the complaint may allege only that the insured is encroaching on the plaintiffs land. Since such a general
complaint could potentially involve numerous situations, it is not
always a simple task to determine from the face of the complaint
whether the title insurance company has a duty to defend.12
Although a title insurance policy usually purports to guarantee "good and indefeasible title" to the property described by the
policy,13 this guarantee is subject to numerous standard and
specially listed exceptions.14The standard exceptions usually exempt from coverage any cloud on the title created by instruments
or acts that are not recorded in public records.I5 Also excluded
from coverage are clouds on the title that occur as a result of
unpatented mining claims, water right claims, governmental regulations, and eminent domain actions.l6 Any cloud on the title
found by searching the public records is listed as a special exception.17 These standard and specially listed exceptions, which frequently turn upon technical rules as to what constitutes record
notice,18taken together with the complexity of real property law,
often make it difficult to determine from the pleadings whether
----

-

-

-

-

-

9. Duty to Defend Made Absolute, supra note 8, a t 1328-29.
10. Id.
11. Duty to Defend, supra note 8, a t 734-35.
12. See Curtis, supra note 3, a t 16. A complaint alleging that the insured is encroaching on the plaintiffs land may or may not involve a title dispute that concerns the insurer.
The insured may have driven on the plaintiffs land without permission, or perhaps
erected a fence on his neighbor's land. It is often impossible to tell from the pleadings
exactly what the true nature of the problem is.
supra note 3, § 5201, a t 2.
13. 9 J. APPLEMAN,
14. Johnstone, supra note 1, a t 494-97; E. &IN, supra note 7, a t 1017-18.
15. In addition, standard title insurance policies generally exclude facts, rights, interests, or claims not shown by the public record but which could be ascertained by inspection of the land or by inquiry of persons in possession thereof. As a result of this exclusion,
the policyholder has no insurance against easements, encroachments, rights of lessees in
possession, boundary discrepancies, or similar matters. Curtis, supra note 3, at 5-7.
16. E. Rmm, supra note 7, at 1017-18.
17. Johnstone, supra note 1, at 496. Because of these exceptions title insurers, unlike
other kinds of insurers, assume very little risk. Id. a t 496-97. For a comprehensive description of the risks assumed by title insurers, see id. at 495-96.
18. Curtis, supra note 3, at 2.
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a duty to defend exists.*@
Reflecting these criticisms, many states have modified the
general rule by creating a duty to defend whenever facts reasonably known to the insurer would create a "potential of l i a b i l i t ~ . " ~ ~
The California court in Jarchow articulated the problem:
The rule regarding an insurer's duty to defend really can take
no other form; otherwise the insured would be required to finance his own defense and then, only if he is successful, hold the
insurer to its promise by means of a second suit for reimbursement. If this construction were followed, a basic reason for the
purchase of insurance would be defeated: instead of having purchased insurance against the trauma and financial hardship of
litigation, the insured will have found that he has purchased
nothing more than a l a ~ s u i t . ~ '

A duty to defend measured by a potential of liability is obviously
a stricter standard providing greater protection to the insured,
particularly if appropriate remedies for wrongful failure to defend
exist.
B. Remedies
1.

Contract remedies

An insurance policy is a contract.22If an agreement to defend
is part of the contract, then wrongful failure to defend is a breach
of contract and contract remedies are appropriate. When an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend the validity of the insured's
19. Id. a t 16. An additional problem, unique to title insurance, occurs when a defect
covered by the title insurance policy exists and is known to the insured, but no adverse
party has instituted suit. The question then becomes whether the insurer has a duty to
defend by initiating a quiet title action. Very little case law exists on the subject, but it
appears that an obligation exists on the part of the insurer to take affirmative action. See
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917,943 n.18, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470,
488 n.18 (Ct. App. 1975); Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.
supra note 3, 9 5215; 25 BAYLOR
L. REV.704 (1973); 8 Hous. L. REV.
1973); 9 J. APPLEMAN,
580 (1971).
20. Duty to Defend Made Absolute, supra note 8, a t 1330. The following are cases in
some of the states that follow the "potential of liability" standard in determining the
existence of a duty to defend: Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 542 P.2d 1031
(Ore. 1975); Evans v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 F. Supp. 1230 (D.C. Alas. 1975);
American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 87 N.M. 375, 533 P.2d 1203 (1975); Spruill
Motors, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 681, 512 P.2d 403 (1973); First
Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Continental Cas. Co., 466 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1972)(Hawaii); Shaw v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 407 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1969)(Illinois); Gray v. Zurich Ins.Co., 65
Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
21. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 942-43, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 488 (Ct. App. 1975).
supra note 3, § 5201, a t 1-2.
22. 9 J. APPLEMAN,
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title, the insured is entitled to recover reasonable expenses in
making the necessary defense.z3These generally include attorneys' fees and any reasonable settlement accepted by the insured
in good faitheZ4
As a general rule, damages for mental suffering are
not available in breach of contract actions, nor are other consequential damages, such as lost business opportunities or inconvenience, since they usually are not considered within the expectations of the contracting parties.25
A distinction is drawn, however, between commercial contracts, which promote a pecuniary or business interest (no emotional distress damages allowed), and personal contracts, such as
contracts with common carriers or innkeepers, which promote
some personal interest (emotional distress damages allowed).26
Historically, courts have viewed insurance contracts as commercial in nature and have not allowed damages for emotional distress.27It is generally felt that one contracting for insurance seeks
a pecuniary benefit and that neither party bargains for or expects
mental distress to accompany a breach of contract.2s
23. Id. # 5216, a t 23.
24. Id. ; see note 3 supra.
25. 5 A. Comm, CONTRACTS
$ 1076, a t 429 (1964); 11W. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS
$1341,
at 214 (3d ed. 1968).
26. See 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS
$ 1076, a t 429 (1964). The most common types of
contracts that are considered personal are contracts to marry, contracts of carriers and
innkeepers with passengers and guests, contracts for the disposition of dead bodies, and
contracts for the delivery of death messages. The common element in personal contracts
is the deep feelings involved, which make mental distress likely upon breach of contract.
See Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers: Recent Developments in the
Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTRE
DAMELAW.1303, 1303-04 (1973).
27. "The traditional measure of contract damages limits recovery to the policy benefits plus interest. New Orleans Ins. Ass'n v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378 (1872). Where
consequential damages are sought the limitations of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (1854) control." Comment, Damages for Mental SufferingCaused by Insurers; Recent
Developments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NOTREDAMELAW.1303, 1304 n.9
(1973). That is, the damages must arise naturally from such breach of contract itself and
have been reasonably contemplated by both parties a t the time of the contract. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILM,THELAW
OF CONTRACTS
$ 206, a t 330 (1970).
28. See Note, Damages Assessed Against Insurers for Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10
WM. & MARYL. REV.466, 467 (1968). Recently, some courts have been swayed by the
argument that insurance contracts are personal, making it easier for the courts to take
the position that damages for emotional distress should be awarded in appropriate cases.
For example, in Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967), the court argued that:
Moreover, plaintiff did not seek by the contract involved here to obtain a commercial advantage but to protect herself against the risks of accidental losses,
including the mental distress which might follow the losses. Among the considerations in purchasing liability insurance, as insurers are well aware, is the peace
of mind and security it will provide in the event of an accidental loss, and
recovery of damages for mental suffering has been permitted for breach of con-
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Tort remedies

In view of the inadequacy of breach of contract remedies in
redressing the insured's injuries, insurance policyholders of all
kinds have turned to tort law to find a more satisfactory basis for
recovery.2gIf a cause of action in tort can be maintained, the
possibility of recovery for emotional distress, inconvenience, and
lost business opportunities exists.30The tort actions of intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing focus on damages for
emotional distress and have been used with some success to redress injuries caused by breach of insurance contract~.~'
Courts
require claims of emotional distress to meet very stringent standards, however, because of the .difficulty of proving and measuring mental injuries and the possibility of vexatious and fictitious
claims .32
Early courts refused to allow any recovery for mental distress
unless i t could be brought within the scope of some already existtracts which directly concern the comfort, happiness or personal esteem of one
of the parties.
Id. a t 434, 426 P.2d a t 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. a t 19. The court did not, however, decide the
case on the distinction between personal and commercial contracts, but found an intentional tort, thus making damages for emotional distress available. Id. The general rule is
still that an insurance contract is a commercial contract, the breach of which will not
support an award of damages for emotional distress. See Farris v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 542 P.2d 1031, 1035-36 (Ore. 1975).
29. See Note, The Widening Scope of Insurer's Liability, 63 KY. L.J. 145, 148 (1975).
30. The greatest advantage in suing in tort comes from the likelihood of greater
damages, since the limitations imposed by the contract on the maximum damages recoverable may be avoided. See, e.g., Quigley v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., 60 Minn.
275, 62 N.W. 287 (1895); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 972 (1958). In addition, tort theory may
extend to items of damage not includible under contract theory (such as emotional distress
damages), may allow the plaintiff to avoid possible setoffs or counterclaims, and may
provide a lighter burden of proof in some instances. W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW
OF TORTS§ 92, a t 618-22 (4th ed. 1971). Tort theory also provides the court with a more
flexible method of achieving equitable results.
Contract theory, however, offers advantages such as a lighter burden of pleading and
proof in some instances, a longer statute of limitations, recovery of bargain damages,
recovery of interest from the date of the breach, survival of the action, additional remedies
such as summary judgment or attachment, and greater opportunities for forum shopping.
See Duty to Search, supra note 1, at 1182 n.114.
31. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,510 P.2d 1032,108Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973)(breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Eckenrode v.
Life of America Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972)(intentional infliction of emotional
distress); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470
(Ct. App. 1975)(negligentinfliction of emotional distress).
32. W. PROSSER,
supra note 30, § 12, a t 50-51; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
8 46,
Comment b at 72 (1965).
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ing tort, such as false imprisonment or assault.33Requiring that
damages for emotional distress be "parasitic" or dependent upon
the existence of an independent tort was thought to assure the
genuineness of the claim.34
Eventually an independent cause of action was recognized
for infliction of emotional distress, even in the absence of some
other harm, when the defendant's behavior was of such a nature
that he knew or should have known that mental distress was
i n e ~ i t a b l eThe
. ~ ~ genuineness of claims under this tort, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, was insured by requiring
the defendant's behavior to be "so outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in
~ ~cases such as these, courts have ala civilized c ~ m m u n i t y . "In
lowed damages for mental distress upon proof that the defendant's conduct was outrageous and that the plaintiff suffered
severe emotional distrem3'
Courts have been reluctant to award damages for emotional
distress inflicted by mere negligence? If the negligent act causes
only mental distress that is not serious enough to produce physical symptoms, such as inability to sleep, loss of weight, ulcers, or
personality changes, there is general agreement that no recovery
is allowed.39Most courts feel that without some physical manifestation of the mental injury, the indicia of genuineness are lacking.40On the other hand, if physical injury such as a broken leg,
is an immediate result of the defendant's negligent act, most
courts allow parasitic damages for emotional distress, with
slightly relaxed criteria of proof.41Thus, if severe emotional distress accompanies a broken leg, damages are appropriate not only
for the broken leg but also for the emotional distress. The immediate physical harm is thought to authenticate the claim for emotional distress.42
33. See Davis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 46 W. Va. 48,32 S.E. 1026 (1899); 46 MISS.
L.J. 871 (1975).
34. See 63 GEO.L.J. 1179, 1183 (1975).
supra note 30, § 12.
35. See W. PROSSER,
36. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF.L. REV.40, 44 (1956).
OF TORTS!j 46 (1965).
37. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
38. Greyson, Recent Developments in the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Shocks,
3 N. KY. ST. L.F. 76, 82 (1975).
39. See id. at 82-83.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 83.
42. Id.
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Where the physical symptoms are not immediate, but follow
subsequently as a result of the shock created by the defendant's
negligent act, the law is not as straightforward. Originally, damages for emotional distress in such cases were awarded only when
accompanied by some "impact" upon the person of the plaintiff
during the course of the negligent act.43The presence or absence
of impact, however, is often a chance occurrence that has little
effect on the degree of seriousness of mental distress. The rigid
application of the rule often creates outrageous results.44In
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway C O . , for
~ ~ example, a horsedrawn
trolley charged the plaintiff, not stopping until the horses were
standing on either side of her. The plaintiff fainted and subsequently suffered a m i s ~ a r r i a g e .The
~ ~ court nevertheless denied
recovery because it found that she had not experienced an impact; mere fright was not sufficient to sustain the action?'
Modern courts have, for the most part, rejected the impact
rule, and now require that the plaintiff be within a "zone of
danger" and reasonably fear for his own safety.48The application
of this test can also produce harsh results in that it prevents
recovery by individuals who do not fear for their own safety (are
outside the zone of danger) but nonetheless suffer genuine emo43. Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent
Tort, 59 GEO.L.J. 1237, 1239 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress]. See Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Sew. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957); Bosley
v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958)(no impact from being chased by trespassing
bull).
44. This rule created strained results. Many courts went to absurd lengths to find
"impact." See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680
(1928)(evacuation of horse's bowels in lap); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175
A.2d 351 (1961) (minor auto collision sufficient impact). Other courts used the impact rule
to deny recovery for serious mental distress in all cases, regardless of how serious the
injury. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896).
45. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
46. Id. a t 109, 45 N.E. a t 354.
47. Id.
48. The impact rule has been rejected in most states. The following cases and states
are cited in Note, Recovery Allowed for Mental Distress Absent Both Impact and Fear of
Impact, 46 MISS. L.J. 871, 875 n.36 (1975), as still accepting the impact rule. St. Louis
I.M. & S.R.R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226 (lWl)(Arkansas); Perry v. Capital
Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 557 (1929) (District of Columbia); Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974)(Florida); Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill.
401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898) (Illinois); Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61
N.E.2d 326 (1945) (Indiana); Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N.W. 1091
(1913)(Iowa); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23
S.W.2d 272 (1929)(Kentucky); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88
(1897)(Massachusetts); Brisboise v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.
1957)(Missouri);cf. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (Utah).
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tional distre~s.'~
A parent who witnesses the death of his child
from the safety of his yard is a common example.50Several courts
have attempted to deal with this problem,51but the majority of
jurisdictions find that the zone of danger test is necessary to
insure that claims are genuine and that negligent individuals are
not exposed to liability that they should not reasonably be expected to bear.52
Application of the traditional impact or zone of danger tests,
coupled with the requirement that mental distress be severe, has
consistently led courts to deny damages for emotional distress
when the emotional distress results from negligent damage to
property." Valley National Bank v. Brown5' is typical of the approach used by most courts. The defendant, Valley National
Bank, wrongfully and negligently garnished Brown's bank account. Brown, suing in tort, prayed for damages for emotional
distress.55The court found that as no "physical invasion" of the
plaintiff's person occurred, no damages for emotional distress
the plaintiff
would be allowed.56In Murphy v. City of Ta~orna,~'
sought damages for emotional distress caused by a landslide that
damaged his real property.58The court held that
there is no reason to deviate from the rule requiring either a
showing of malice or some actual or threatened physical invasion of the person in order to warrant recovery of damages for
"mental anguish, suffering, annoyance, discomfort and inconvenien~e."~~
49. See 63 Geo. L.J. 1179, 1186 (1975).
50. Id; see, e.g., Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952).
51. Some courts have extended the scope of liability to allow recovery to individuals
who directly witness an injury to a close relative and suffer severe emotional distress as a
result. See, e.g., D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I.), modified, 481 F.2d
14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1969).
52. See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
53. See Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, supra note 43, at 1242.
54. 110 Ariz. 260, 517 P.2d 1256 (1974).
55. Id. at 262, 517 P.2d a t 1258.
56. Id. at 265, 517 P.2d at 1261. The Court found that:
[Wlith but a few minor exceptions, the rule is that where no malice or
intent is shown, no damages may be awarded for mental anguish or distress of
mind. The exception to the rule occurs when it is shown that there is a physical
invasion of a person or the person's security. No such physical invasion occured
[sic] here . . . "no damages can be allowed for mental pain or suffering" in
actions of this nature.
Id. (citations omitted).
57. GO'Wash. 2d 603, 374 P.2d 976 (1962).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 622, 374 P.2d at 988.
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A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
All states that recognize the intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort allow recovery for emotional distress in appropriate insurance cases.60In Fletcher v.
Western National Life Insurance CO.,~*
the plaintiff sustained a
back injury in the course of his employment, rendering him unable to work. Examining experts were virtually unanimous in
their assessment that the plaintiff was disabled because of his
back injury." Despite overwhelming evidence of its liability, however, the insurer attempted to persuade the claimant to accept
an unfavorable settlement. The insurer accused the insured of
having misrepresented significant facts in his application for insurance, attempted to characterize the defect as congenital, and
demanded return of money already paid.s3 The court awarded
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, concluding that the conduct of the insurer was outrageous and deplorable .64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
applied Illinois law in Eckenrode v. Life of America Insurance
C O .and,
~ ~ like the California court in Fletcher, allowed damages
for intentional infliction of emotional distress? Following her
husband's murder, the plaintiff in Eckenrode submitted a claim
for the proceeds of an insurance policy on her husband's life. The
insurance company, although fully aware that the plaintiff had a
valid claim, repeatedly refused payment and attempted to coerce
her into compromising her claim.17 The court found that the insurance company was on notice of the plaintiffs sensitive state
of mind following an event so ghastly as the murder of her husband and that, under the circumstances, the insurer abused its
superior bargaining position by attempting to coerce a settlement? In the court's view, such conduct was outrageous enough
60. Provided the requisite "outrageous" conduct and severe emotional distress were
shown, there is no reason why recovery would not be granted. See text accompanying notes
35-37 supra.
61. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
62. Id. at 386-87, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
63. Id. at 388-90, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 84-85.
64. Id. at 394-96, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88-89.
65. 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 4-5.
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 2-3.
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to warrant damages for intentional infliction of mental distress.
In Frishett u. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
CO.,~'the Michigan Court of Appeals held that an insured could
recover for emotional distress caused by the insurer's wrongful
acts, provided that such acts were done with the intent of causing
emotional distress.'O The insurer had wrongfully withheld medical payments, made false statements, and obtained information
of a private nature to use against the plaintiff.71
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that an insured could recover damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress where the insurer intentionally
failed to defend or settle within the policy limits.72The court,
holding that an action would lie in contract, in tort, or in both,
noted that even though the plaintiffs burden of proof might be
difficult to meet, a cause of action had been stated.73
It is clear that in those states that recognize an independent
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
damages may be obtained if the conduct of the insurer meets the
standards of outrageousness required. This, however, is of limited
value to most title insurance policyholders, as it is only in rare
circumstances that failure to defend title can be characterized as
"outrageous" conduct. The vagaries of the exclusions attached to
a title policy give ample opportunity to base refusal to defend on
a relatively sound legal theory-at least one that can be invoked
in good faith.74Thus, negligence, rather than outrageousness, is
more often the label that will be applied by the courts to the
conduct of title insurers.

B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
The impact and zone of danger tests severely limit the availability of a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress when a title insurer wrongfully fails to defend. As discussed previously, states that continue to demand that there be
some impact upon the plaintiff or that the plaintiff be within the
zone of danger before negligent infliction of emotional distress is
actionable generally refuse to recognize a cause of action when the
69.
70.
71.
72.
1972).
73.
74.

3 Mich. App. 688, 143 N.W.2d 612 (Ct. App. 1966).
Id. at 614.
Id. at 612-13.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 350 F. Supp. 869 (D. Conn.

Id.. at 872-73.
See text accompanying notes 12-19 supra.
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emotional distress is a result of injury to a property right." Several recent cases, however, have recognized an independent cause
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress or have used
tests that allow recovery for mental distress caused by damage to
a property interest.
In First National Bank v. Langley, 76 the plaintiff sought
damages for emotional distress caused by the bank's negligence
in searching for a lost deposit that had been placed in the night
depository.77It took the plaintiff several weeks to persuade the
bank to dismantle the mechanism of the night depository in an
effort to recover the lost deposit. In the meantime, the plaintiff
was suspected of stealing the deposit.78The Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that a defendant whose negligence creates a foreseeable risk of mental distress can be held liable for genuine
injuries that result from such distre~s.'~
The court expressly abandoned the impact rule and did not use the zone of danger rule to
limit recovery
~ ~ court
In Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Insurance C O . ,the
upheld a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.82The plaintiff contended that as a result of the defendant's
negligent title search he was unaware of potential adverse claims
to the title of his property and suffered lost business opportunities, lost savings, and emotional distress when these claims were
The court concluded that if a plaintiff had suffered
substantial damage apart from the emotional distress, recovery
for damages for severe emotional distress would be allowed. The
court reasoned that a plaintiff who has been deprived of the use
or possession of real or personal property, or suffered physical
injury, has suffered substantial damage that provides sufficient
assurance of genuineness to allow recovery for emotional distress." The court made it clear, however, that it does not yet
recognize an independent tort for negligent infliction of emotional
distress that would permit recovery when mental distress is the
only damage caused by the defendent's wrongful conduct.85Yet,
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
314 So. 2d 324 (Miss. 1975).
Id. at 327-28.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id.
48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct. App. 1975).
Id. at 939-40, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
See id. at 950-51, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
Id. at 936-39, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 483-85.
Id. at 937 n.11, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 484 n.11.

8951

TITLE INSURANCE

907

by using a standard based upon substantial damage apart from
the emotional distress, rather than the impact test or the zone of
danger test, the California courts are approaching recognition of
an independent tort for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In fact, the Jarchow court concluded that the "indorsement of
such an action seems to be the logical end product of the decisional trends in this area."86
The most straightforward treatment of damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress is offered by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii. In Rodrigues v. State,87the plaintiffs home was
flooded due to the negligence of a state road maintenance crew?
The plaintiff sought damages for negligent infliction of serious
mental distress as well as for injury to the home.89 The court
found that "the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of
serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protecti~n."~O
Artificial barriers to recovery, such as the impact or zone
of danger tests, were not applied; rather, the court relied on general tort principles to determine the appropriateness of reco~ery.~'
Although these cases indicate a trend to reject the impact
and zone of danger rules and to rely instead on general negligence
principles in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases, most
jurisdictions are not presently willing to extend the scope of liability to allow damages for emotional distress resulting from negligent injury to a property interest. Consequently, as a remedy for
failure to defend in title insurance cases, a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress is generally not helpful.g2

C. Breach of an Implied Covenant of Good Faith
In several jurisdictions, every insurance contract is considered to contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." Breach of this covenant gives rise to an independent tort
86. Id.
87. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
88. Id. at 159, 472 P.2d at 513.
89. Id. at 160, 472 P.2d at 513-14.
90. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
91. Id. The court concluded that "the question of whether the defendant is liable [for
damages for emotional distress] to the plaintiff in any particular case will be solved most
justly by the application of general tort principles." Id. It is clear from the discussion in
this case and the authorities cited that the impact and zone of danger rules are not
considered general tort principles but are considered limitations on general tort principles.
92. See text accompanying notes 52-59 supra.
93. The following states appear to imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
each insurance contract: Barnes v. Atlantic & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of America, 325 So. 2d
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action for "bad faith," notwithstanding that the acts complained
of may also constitute a breach of contract.94As with most tort
actions, the plaintiff may recover for all damages proximately
resulting from the breach,95including any emotional distress suffered?
It is generally easier to carry the burden of proof in an action
for breach of implied covenant of good faith than in an action for
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The
plaintiff need not show outrageous conduct or negligence on the
part of the defendant?' Mere failure of the insurer to defend
creates a cause of action. It also appears that the impact and zone
of danger rules may not apply,g8thus permitting recovery of damages for emotional distress caused by injury to a property interest.
In Jarchow, for example, the defendant title insurer claimed that
it did not have a duty to defend? The court found that a t the
time of the suit, from the facts known to the insurance company,
a potential of liability existed. Therefore, the insurer had a duty
to defend. Breach of that duty was held to be a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.loOThe court
awarded $170 for loss of the use of the land, $7100 for attorneys'
fees, and $200,000 for emotional distress.lol
At present, because of its lighter burden of proof, an action
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
appears to be the best approach for policyholders seeking to re143 (Ala. 1975); Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hosp. Care of Hosp. Sew. Corp., 29
Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson,
540 P.2d 1070 (Nev. 1975); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alas. 1974);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Key
Life Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 129 Ga. App. 192, 198 S.E.2d 919 (1973); Matthews v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 212 Kan. 292, 510 P.2d 1315 (1973).
94. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071 (Nev. 1975).
95. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
96. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 939, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (Ct. App. 1975). This may not
always be the case. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
97. Id. at 939 n.14, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 486 n.14.
98. To require impact or presence in a zone of danger before damages for m e n d
distress are allowed in breach of implied covenants of good faith cases makes little sense,
since only under unusual circumstances would an insurer's breach result in impact or
danger to the insured.
99. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 940, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 486 (Ct. App. 1975).
100. Id. at 943-44, 122 Cal. Rptr. a t 488. The court noted in passing that an alternative to assuming the defense of its insured when the issue of coverage is unclear is a
declaratory relief action to test its duty. If the insurer elects not to file a declaratory relief
action but to treat the alleged title defect as illusory, the court concluded that the insurer
must bear the risk of its decision, and may subsequently be found to have acted in bad
faith. Id. a t 942-43 nn.16 & 18, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 488 nn.16 & 18.
101. Id. at 923, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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cover damages for emotional distress caused by failure of the title
insurer to defend.lo2Several problems, however, limit its usefulness. First, not all states read this covenant into insurance contracts.lo3Second, it is not clear at this point how future courts will
deal with emotional distress damages awarded under this cause
of action. It may be that barriers similar to the impact or zone of
danger tests will be imposed to limit recovery of mental distress
damages. For example, the California courts require "substantial
damage," apart from the emotional distress, before recovery can
be obtained.lo4

Most of the changes in the law governing the award of damages for emotional distress have resulted from the conflict created
by the use of arbitrary rules, such as the impact and zone of
danger rules, to eliminate vexatious and fictitious claims.lo5The
mechanical application of these rules often creates inequitable
resultslo6and offends the principle that the law provides a remedy
for every wrong. This is particularly true when the emotional
distress arises from injury to a property interest. The conflict is
illustrated clearly in the area of title insurance where, in most
jurisdictions, the requirement of actual or threatened impact to
the person precludes damages for emotional distress, even in
cases where genuine emotional injury has occurred.lo7
The special relationship between the title insurer and insured makes the risk of emotional distress foreseeable and should
require compensation by the title insurer for emotional distress
resulting from breach of the title insurer's duties to the policyholder. The typical title insurance policyholder is a homeowner
who, in order to obtain financing for his home, was required by
the mortgage company to buy a title insurance policy. This unsophisticated purchaser has no input into the contract he
signslo8and reasonably expects that title insurance will protect
his investment from future title problems.lO@
Loss of this most
102. See text accompanying notes 93-100 supra.
103. See note 93 supra.
104. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 944, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 489 (Ct. App. 1975).
105. See text accompanying notes 43-52 w p m .
106. Id.
107. See text accompanying notes 53-59 supra.
108. See Duty to Search, supra note 1, at 1179.
109. Curtis, supra note 3, at 1.
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important investment could reasonably be expected to create extreme emotional upheaval in his life. The title insurance company, on the other hand, represents an institution that, in many
states, holds a virtual monopoly on the abstracting busine~s."~
The general public depends upon these companies for accurate
reports of the state of title.lll
Jarchow typifies the type of case that in most states would
have no adequate remedy. In that case, the plaintiffs invested
their life savings in a plan to build a small b u s i n e s ~ They
.~~
obtained the land along with a title insurance policy and were
about to proceed when an adverse claimant clouded the title to
the land.l13 The title insurer refused to defend, leaving the plaintiffs with no choice but to clear the title themselves.114
The subsequent court action exhausted their savings, created mental stress
as they strove to extricate themselves, and eventually resulted in
a failure to achieve their goals.l15Had the title insurer defended,
the plaintiffs' expectations a t the time they bought the policy
would have been fulfilled. They would have had no expense. In
addition, return of their investment in the event that title to the
land remained clouded would have been assured.
A better solution to the problems of damages for emotional
distress would seem to be one suggested years ago by Dean Prosser and now accepted by several of the states, as illustrated by
the cases cited earlier in this ~omment.*~VI"he
problem, according
to Prosser, should be confronted and resolved by rules of proof
rather than by imposition of limits on the negligence action itself.ll' The growing competence of medical science in the field of
psychic injuries has diminished the problems of proof in this
area.l18 Many authorities now feel that science can establish with
reasonable medical certainty the existence and severity of psychic
harm and that the case law involving damages for emotional
distress should evolve to keep pace with the increased sophistication of psychiatry. l l @Certainly reliance on general negligence
110. Id. at 20; Quiner, supm note 1, at 721.
111. See Curtis, supra note 3, at 20.
112. 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 930-31, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470,479-80 (Ct. App. 1975).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 927, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
115. Id. at 927, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
116. See text accompanying notes 76-91 supm.
117. W. PROSSER,
supra note 30, # 54, at 328.
118. 63 GEO.L.J. 1179, 1184 (1975).
supra note 30, # 12, at 50-51. See also Comment, Negligently
119. See W. PROSSER,
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO.L.J. 1237, 1253
(1971). For an excellent case which reviews these arguments, see Rodrigues v. State, 52
Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
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principles would provide a more equitable solution for meritorious cases in all areas of the law, including title insurance, while
still guarding against vexatious and fictitious claims. Further, the
availability of a remedy for wrongful infliction of emotional distress would encourage title insurers to defend within the provisions of their policies.

